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HOW THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR NEW DISCRIMINATION: EXAMINING
THE TRAJECTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Michael A. Helfand'
ABSTRACT
This Article advocates differentiating between two distinct categories of equal
protection cases. The first-what I have termed indicator cases-are instances where
courts consider whether there are sufficient factual indications to demonstrate the
existence of aprimafacie equal protection violation. The second-violation cases-
are instances where courts consider, having already determined the existence of an
equal protection violation, whether there is a good enough justification for a prima
facie equal protection violation. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not differen-
tiated between these two different types of cases. This has led to a string of decisions
where the Supreme Court has erroneously looked for justifications for non-existent
Equal Protection Clause violations, when in fact it should have been looking for in-
dications to determine whether there actually had been an Equal Protection Clause
violation. But even more troubling are some of the suggestions on the horizon; for
example, the diversity rationale adopted by the Court as sufficient to survive strict
scrutiny could serve to justify discriminatory police tactics such as racial profiling. By
clearly outlining the above distinction and its analytic ramifications, this Article hopes
to undermine such arguments built on the diversity rationale as wholly unfounded.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that the so-called "diversity rationale" has become the central
focus of current Equal Protection doctrine and debate.' Prior to the Supreme Court's
plurality decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 the only interest
considered sufficiently tailored and compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny was the fear
of military invasion.3 Indeed, for over thirty years, strict scrutiny appeared to be strict
in theory but fatal in fact;4 therefore, the first signs of the Court's willingness to con-
sider diversity as a sufficiently compelling interest understandably have spawned sig-
nificant attention and litigation.5 To some, the diversity rationale has held out hope
For a sample of the debate over the effectiveness of the "diversity rationale" within the
equal protection context, see Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution,
1 STANFORD J. C.R. & C.L. 171 (2005); Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity Rationale
in University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University of Michigan Cases, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2005); L. Darnell Weeden, Back to the Future: Should Grutter's
Diversity Rationale Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title VII Implicated?, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 511 (2005). See also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470
(2004) (discussing generally the conceptualization of race and racial equality after Brown v.
Board of Education); Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1299807.
2 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.3.3.1 (2d ed. 2002).
4 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 9.1.
' See The Year of Bakke: Excerpts from Published Commentary, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., July 3, 1978, at 36 (reprinting media and legal commentary on the Bakke decision);
Conflicting Reactions to the Bakke Decision, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 3, 1978, at 12
(reprinting reactions from various legal and academic commentators to the Bakke decision);
see also Synnott, supra note 1 (discussing the reactions to the Bakke decision and the decisions
that followed).
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for race-based remedies to a wide range of social, economic, and political inequalities;
to others, it stands as the greatest threat to principles of colorblindness.
These two perspectives on the diversity rationale clamored for air-time after
the Court's landmark decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1. 6 The Court's primary holding was to limit the line of cases re-
garding the use of diversity in education-including, most notably, Bakke and Grutter
v. Bollinger--concluding that race was not a legitimate consideration in the elemen-
tary school assignment plans that were before the Court.8
Some critics decried the landmark ruling, fearing that, in limiting the permissi-
bility of race as a consideration, the Supreme Court's decision would further hinder
equal access to equal education. 9 For example, Charles Ogletree, penning an editorial
in the Boston Globe, summarized his dismay in the ruling by noting that the Court's
decision "removed a successful tool for combating the racial segregation that is a
ubiquitous feature of the nation's public schools."' ° Eugene Robinson used even more
inflammatory rhetoric in his Washington Post editorial, exclaiming that "[i]f we as
a society-black, white, brown, yellow, red-are going to work toward fairness, in-
clusion, equality and, yes, integration, we're going to have to do it by working around
those dour men in black robes on Capitol Hill. They have decided to stand in the
schoolhouse door."'"1
Predictably, others lauded the Court's decision for foreclosing a perceived loop-
hole in the Equal Protection Clause's "colorblindness principle," limiting the use of
the diversity rationale in creating school assignment schemes. 2 For example, George
Will lamented that Brown's
promise-a colorblind society-has been traduced by the "diver-
sity" exception to the Equal Protection Clause. That exception
allows white majorities to feel noble while treating blacks and cer-
tain other minorities as seasoning-a sort of human oregano- to
be sprinkled across a student body to make the majority's educa-
tional experience more flavorful. 3
6 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
7 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8 See discussion infra Part X.
9 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Op-Ed., Brown's Legacy Lives, but Barely, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 29,2007, at A17; Eugene Robinson, Standing in the Schoolhouse Door, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2007, at A2 1.
'0 Ogletree, supra note 9.
" Robinson, supra note 9.
12 See, e.g., George F. Will, Editorial, Simple Justice: The Law Should Not Discriminate
on the Basis of Color, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETrE, July 5, 2007, at B7.
13 id.
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In other words, in Parents Involved, the Court took the first step in mitigating the
damage caused by the diversity rationale.
General perspectives on the use of diversity in formulating educational policy also
informed the way many commentators depicted Justice Kennedy's concurrence. 4
For some, Kennedy's decisive concurrence-which noted that the majority opinion
"impl[ied] an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor"' 5-advanced
a "middle ground" which held out "hope" for the future.16 Similarly, Charles Ogletree
depicted the decision as "fractured," stating that Kennedy "refuse[d] to embrace the
four-person plurality view that race cannot be considered in seeking to achieve edu-
cational equality."' 7 On this account, Kennedy, in line with the scathing dissent of
Justice Breyer, contained at least "some small, and welcome, affirmation of the princi-
ples [the Supreme Court] articulated 53 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education."'18
And to those who applauded the majority decision, Kennedy's reluctance tojoin whole-
heartedly was glossed over in an attempt to emphasize the existence of a majority
unified in limiting the role of the diversity rationale. 9
Thus, initial reactions to Parents Involved generally portrayed the opinion as
follows: the majority advanced colorblindness, at the expense of the potential reme-
dial effects of diversity, while the dissent championed educational equality at the ex-
pense of colorblind policies. In between these two extremes stands Justice Kennedy's
concurrence--or so the common thinking goes-which articulated some sort of
middle ground that incorporated elements of these two hard-line positions.
But lurking behind the various partisan portrayals of the Parents Involved deci-
sion is a new line of argumentation that has surreptitiously emerged in debates over
the future of the Equal Protection Clause. This Article refers to this type of argument
as the "a fortiori argument" and it employs the diversity rationale in a way that is
somewhat counter-intuitive.20 Consider the following paradigmatic example:
Similarly, racial profiling policies and guidelines that permit law
enforcement officers to consider race, among other factors, when
"4 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2788 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1" Id. at 279 1.
16 Editorial, A Backward Step, BALT. SUN, June 29,2007, at 18A; see also Editorial, High
Court Denies Equal Education, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, July 1, 2007, at B6.
'" Ogletree, supra note 9.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., David Reinhard, Editorial, Back to Brown: A Step Ahead to a More Color-
blind Constitution, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, July 1, 2007, at El (mentioning only that Kennedy
wrote a separate concurrence); Will, supra note 12 (not mentioning Kennedy's concurrence);
Editorial, Diversity the Right Way, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 2007, at 6C (describing Kennedy as
simply "provid[ing] the fifth vote for the majority").
20 For a more in-depth discussion of afortiori arguments, see infra Part IX.
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they possess "trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or
time frame, that links persons of a particular race or ethnicity to
an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization" also
pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause. If student body
diversity in university law schools is a compelling governmental
interest, then surely crime control also qualifies as such.2'
Thus, the argument functions by considering what government interests are more
compelling than diversity. If diversity is compelling, then afortiori other interests,
previously considered insufficient to pass constitutional muster, should be re-evaluated
in light of the Court's decisions regarding diversity.22 These arguments find the diver-
sity rationale useful because, in the past, interests deemed sufficiently compelling were
those considered as critical as the national security interest invoked in Korematsu;23
the diversity rationale has lowered the bar for what qualifies as a compelling govern-
ment interest.
Such arguments turn the diversity rationale on its head. Instead of promoting
improved equality in educational opportunities, the diversity rationale-as the first
step in the afortiori argument-serves as the analytical leverage necessary to justify
radical racial inequalities, such as racial profiling. 24 Put differently, while some sup-
port the diversity rationale because they believe it can level the racial playing field,
a fortiori arguments use the diversity rationale for the exact opposite purpose25
This Article suggests that afortiori arguments are based upon an analytical mis-
take plaguing current equal protection doctrine. And it is the primary purpose of this
Article to expose the origins of this analytical mistake by demonstrating that much
of the current Supreme Court doctrine has confused two types of equal protection
cases. The first category of cases-indicator cases-involves circumstances where
the Court must look at various indications-such as racial classifications, lack of nar-
row tailoring and lack of substantial enough purposes-to determine whether they
believe there has been an Equal Protection Clause violation. The second category of
cases-violation cases-involves circumstances where the Court already has evidence
of a primafacie Equal Protection Clause violation, and must then examine whether
the purposes are substantial enough to justify the prima facie violation. As argued
below, the confusing of these two types of Equal Protection Clause cases has led to
21 Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestionsfor the Limited Use and
Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTs. L.J. 219,
233-34 (2005) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, RACIAL
PROFILING FAcT SHEET (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial
_profiling-factsheet.pdf).
22 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24 See Smith, supra note 21.
25 See id.; see also discussion infra Part IX.
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peculiar outcomes in affirmative action cases, giving rise to the hotly contested
diversity rationale.26
Differentiating between these categories will allow us to better appreciate the
importance of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved. Indeed, while
some of the initial portrayals of Kennedy's concurrence simply see it as a compromise
position between the more extreme alternatives, this is far from the case. A closer
analysis of Kennedy's concurrence, in light of our analytic framework, will demon-
strate that Kennedy has recast the diversity rationale, removing it from the list of
compelling government interests. In doing so, Kennedy's concurrence pulls out the
analytic rug from under afortiori arguments.
To this end, Part I will revisit how strict scrutiny became the mechanism to test
for potential Equal Protection Clause violations and Part II will consider why the strict
scrutiny mechanism has been used to protect racial classifications. Part III will exam-
ine the underlying process-based theory that continues to drive the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. Part IV will consider how intent became the gravamen
of equal protection violations; in doing so, this Article aims to unpack what "invidious
discriminatory intent" might mean and how the intent criterion gave rise to two funda-
mentally distinct categories of equal protection cases. With this distinction in hand,
Part V will look at the Supreme Court's application of the intent criterion to cases of
"benign classifications," reconciling some of the alleged contradictory conclusions
reached by the Court in some of its landmark equal protection cases. Part VI considers
the purpose of the narrow tailoring mechanism and how it might differ depending on
what type of equal protection case is before the Court. Part VII summarizes the fore-
going argument, noting the problematic aspects of Equal Protection Clause doctrine.
Part VIII uncovers the problematic application of strict scrutiny in the recent affir-
mative action cases, stemming from the Court's failure to differentiate between the
varying types of equal protection cases outlined in this Article. Part IX exposes the
error of afortiori arguments, which capitalize on the confusion between indication
and violation cases. Finally, Part X re-examines Kennedy's concurrence in Parents
Involved, which provides the analytic groundwork to sidestep afortiori arguments.
Indeed, because current doctrinal confusions are so embedded in our understanding of
the Equal Protection Clause, avoiding the consequences of afortiori arguments may
require recasting the diversity rationale's place under the Equal Protection Clause.
26 Jed Rubenfeld has noted a parallel distinction by highlighting what appear to be the two
different purposes of strict scrutiny as articulated by the Court. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Anti Anti-Discrimination, 111
YALE L.J. 1141, 1174 (2002). However, Rubenfeld does not differentiate between these two
types of cases primarily because he does not believe that violation cases are a coherent articu-
lation of the doctrine. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text; see also Kim Forde-
Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J.
2331, 2354-64 (2000) (discussing the application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications
intended to benefit racial minorities).
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I. THE PLACE OF STRICT SCRUTINY
It goes without saying that the text of the Equal Protection Clause is notoriously
ambiguous: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 27 In addition, the absence of congressional direction in
operationalizing the Equal Protection Clause has forced the Supreme Court to
"devise[ ] standards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. '28 Thus, in the Slaughter-
House Cases, the Supreme Court articulated what it took to be the general purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause: "The existence of laws in the States where the
newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by
it such laws are forbidden. '29 But this general description of the purpose only gets
us so far. How exactly courts should operationalize the Equal Protection Clause into
workable criteria has been the question the Supreme Court has tried to answer since
the Equal Protection Clause's ratification.3"
With the landmark, and infamous, case Korematsu v. United States, the Court
chose a mechanism of applying strict scrutiny to particular cases in order to deter-
mine whether or not there had been an Equal Protection Clause violation:
[AIll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can.3 '
More recently, the Court has described the purpose of strict scrutiny "to 'smoke out'
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal impor-
tant enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
3 2
Together, the Slaughter-House Cases and Korematsu characterize scrutiny as
a mechanism to examine whether racial classifications are being used
legitimately-that is, in a way that does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.33
But this description simply begs the question, why should racial classifications be
the subject of strict scrutiny?
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
29 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
30 See, e.g., id.
31 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
32 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
" See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text; see also infra pp. 37-38.
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II. WHY PROTECT RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS?
In many ways, the story of suspect classifications begins with age-old concerns
regarding the "countermajoritarian difficulty." At its core, the countermajoritarian
difficulty is meant to engage "the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review
by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be
a political democracy. 35 In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, one answer
has been to construe the Equal Protection Clause as a democracy-enhancing principle,
one that focuses on the way in which judicial review can explore and rectify the poten-
tial pitfalls of an unbridled democratic system.36 Thus, one concern regarding democ-
racy left unchecked is the potential that certain minority groups will simply not be
represented in the democratic process.37 Moreover, the majority might impose severe
harms and restrictions on a particular minority group given the potential for festering
animus towards that group.38 Indeed, this concern is as old as the Constitution itself.39
Construing the Equal Protection Clause as an answer to the countermajoritarian
difficulty starts with footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products.4° According
' Alexander Bickel famously coined this term. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrrIcs 16(1962). For a com-
prehensive review and analysis of the history of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002);
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson
of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 (2000); Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Countermajoritarian
Part Five]. See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WETHEPEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Stephen G.
Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1373
(1998); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287 (2004);
Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245 (1995).
35 Friedman, Countermajoritarian Part Five, supra note 34, at 155.
36 This was most famously the aim of JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
135-79 (1980).
31 See id.
38 See id.
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 40-41 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
40 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This is not to say that such reasoning is correct, only that
it is the route most typically traveled. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly referenced footnote
four in many of its equal protection cases. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 218 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989);
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to the Court, "discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition."' Therefore,
legislation directed at such minorities should be scrutinized to insure that it does not
"curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities."42 In Carolene Products, the Court also gave some examples of
"discrete and insular minorities": religious, national, and racial minorities.
43
By sorting out particular minorities as worthy of protection, the Court empha-
sized the potential problem of unbridled democracy and offered a potential solution.'
Using the Equal Protection Clause to subject certain legislation to "more exacting
judicial scrutiny"45 could fend off majoritarian legislative initiatives intended to politi-
cally debilitate minorities from getting a fair shake in the political arena.
But this is all quite vague. The Court's first foray into a scrutiny-based approach
to the countermajoritarian difficulty left two questions unanswered. First, what were
the criteria for inclusion into the category of "discrete and insular minorities"? And
second, what would the contours of a scrutiny doctrine look like? It is into this vac-
uum that the now well-rehearsed suspect classification and strict scrutiny doctrines
have been introduced.
Ill. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AND STRICT SCRUTINY: THE PROCESS-BASED
UNDERSTANDING
On the canonical story recounted thus far, the doctrinal innovation of strict
scrutiny links up directly with footnote four in Carolene Products.46 The Court has
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,288 (1978); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365,372 (1971). However, Bruce Ackerman has famously argued that the "discrete and
insular minority" analysis in footnote four ignores the more precarious position of "anonymous
and diffuse" groups. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV.
713 (1985).
41 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
42 Id.
43 id.
4 Id.; see also Ackerman, supra note 40, at 715.
15 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
' I refer here to the process-based understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as
"canonical" not because it is a universally accepted framework to understand the Equal
Protection Clause. To the contrary, scholars and judges continue to debate the merit of other
interpretive paradigms as applied to the Equal Protection Clause. Most notably, there has been
ample debate over the coherence of originalism as applied to the Equal Protection Clause.
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 14 (1971); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLiiCAL SEDUCriON OF THE LAW (1990) (discussing the increased politicization of the Court
the "theories of how Judges should conduct themselves"). In this Article, I do not attempt to
resolve this debate, but simply to note some of originalism's most formidable critics. See Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980);
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described strict scrutiny as a tool "to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool."47 Thus, strict scrutiny is used to investigate whether legislation employ-
ing a suspect classification does in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause. 4 In doing
so, it unmasks invidious legislation or regulations as enactments of the majority in-
tended to harm a discrete and insular minority. 49 But who qualifies as a discrete and
insular minority? On this canonical account, groups likely to fall victim to majori-
tarian politics are included; and it is these groups that are deemed protected groups
whose classifications are considered suspect.
It is thus unsurprising that at the core of the Supreme Court's case law deter-
mining which classifications are suspect we find the following "traditional indicia
of suspectness": "the class is... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process. 50 Thus, either past history or current political demographics give us good rea-
son to believe that certain protected classes have not been appropriately represented
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Sanford Levinson,
Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990); Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, supra note 26 (discussing origi-
nalism in the context of the Equal Protection Clause); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781
(1983); see also Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991) (redefining many of John Hart Ely's definitions
of constitutional interpretation in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 36).
Instead, when I describe the canonical account of the Equal Protection Clause as process-
based, I mean to express my own view that the dominant account that has animated the
Supreme Court's majority decisions regarding the Equal Protection Clause are best described
as grounded in a process-based theory. Of course, individual justices have expressed their own
affinities for originalism. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and
Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REv. 245, 328 n.365 (1997) (recounting the affinities for origi-
nalism of various Supreme Court justices). But here I try to present the dominant theory that
explains the Court's decisions. It is of this fact I hope, among other arguments, to convince the
reader in this Article. In turn, the conclusions of this Article-the confusions of equal pro-
tection categories highlighted in this Article-are built off of this process-based theory. In this
way, the conclusions of this Article are predicated on my view that, for the most part, a process-
based theory has animated the Court's equal protection decisions. For now, I leave it up to the
reader to determine whether the reliance on a process-based theory is a good or bad devel-
opment. See Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Alienage, Immutability,
and the Process-Based Paradigm (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
' City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,441 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 n.17 (1973).
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in the political arena; in turn, animus and not deliberation may serve as the motivation
driving a particular suspect classification employed in a given piece of legislation."
In applying these indicators, the Court has concluded that racial classifications
are subject to "the most rigid of scrutiny."52 Because of our experience with past
discrimination against particular racial groups and our knowledge about the current
political power of particular racial groups, we have reason to believe, by default, that
the use of a racial classification indicates that the ordinance or statute in question
does not provide equal protection of the laws: "[A] core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based
on race. Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial
prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the
category., 53 In contrast, other classifications, such as height or age, are not subject
to rigid scrutiny because neither their history nor their current political strength
gives us reason to presume that their use indicates an Equal Protection violation.54
" Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that
all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric-
tions; racial antagonism never can.").
52 Id.
" Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citations omitted).
14 This is, of course, a somewhat simplistic picture of the way in which the law constructs
suspect classifications. Our discussion ignores other complicating factors, most notably the
immutability factor. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87. Immutability remains a confused
area of the law with even the Supreme Court itself equivocating on whether it ought to be con-
sideration in the construction of suspect classifications. Mass. Bd. ofRet., 427 U.S. 307 (ignor-
ing immutability as a factor in determining whether age could be a suspect classification);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (same as applied to the indigent). Indeed, on one
occasion, the Court explicitly rejected immutability as a consideration for creating new suspect
classifications. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443 n. 10 (concluding that the developmentally
disabled do not constitute a suspect classification and citing Ely's critique of immutability).
Because of this confusion, many scholars have struggled to apply immutability to new potential
suspect classifications. See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 646, 653 (2001) ("This in turn raises the immediate question: what constitutes a
'substantial' cost or difficulty, sufficient to render the characteristic substantially immutable?");
Marc R. Shapiro, Comment, Treading the Supreme Court's Murky Immutability Waters, 38
GoNz. L. REv. 409,412 (2002) ("Given immutability's problematic nature, the Court should
explicitly adopt the 'effective immutability' approach of Judge William Norris in Watkins.").
This type of analysis, in turn, leads to peculiar questions about the potential immutability of
all sorts of human characteristics. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official
Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293,334 n.262 (1989) (argu-
ing that the obstacles to learning a new language justify the conclusion that foreign language
speakers ought to constitute a protected class); Elizabeth Kristen, Comment, Addressing the
Problem of Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REv. 57,71 (2002) ("I assume
that to be fat is not necessarily unhealthy and that weight is either immutable or so difficult or
dangerous to permanently change as to be practically immutable.").
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In other words, there are not sufficient indicators to warrant scrutinizing the statute
or regulation in question.
IV. THE NEW INDICATOR: INTENT
In the 1971 case Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court considered an
equal protection claim of job applicants who were required either to have a high
school diploma or to pass an intelligence test in order to be placed or transferred to any
department other than the labor department." According to the petitioners, because
these requirements had a disparate impact on African-American applicants, they vio-
lated Title VII." The Court agreed with the petitioners and held that job requirements
having a disparate impact on the employment opportunities for a protected racial class
violate Title VII.57 Initially, it seemed as if Griggs would provide the grounds for
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause broadly as the Court appeared poised to em-
ploy the same disparate impact rationale already used to interpret Title VII.58
However, with the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, the Griggs "dispro-
portionate impact" holding was limited to Title VII as the Court ruled that, under the
Equal Protection Clause, "our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."59
Indeed, "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone,
it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations."'
Moreover, many scholars have struggled to understand what role immutability plays in
the construction of racial classifications given that, as per past Supreme Court precedent, it
is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion for suspect classification status. See, e.g., Janet
E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLAL. REV. 915,965 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and
the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073 n.51 (1979). For this reason,
Laurence Tribe has argued that underlying the facade of the procedural understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause lies a substantive account that in actuality serves as the driving force
behind the Court's jurisprudence. Id. at 1063.
I hope to address these issues in a future project. See Helfand, supra note 46. Suffice
it to say for our current purposes that the thrust of Supreme Court decisions applies a
process-based paradigm and it is my own contention that immutability's role under current
doctrine, while requiring clarification, does in fact further the overall integrity of the
process-based paradigm.
55 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
56 Id. at 425-26.
57 Id. at 436.
58 Id. at 435-36.
9 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
60 Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
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The Washington v. Davis decision, however, did not mean that in order to trig-
ger strict scrutiny a party had to demonstrate invidious discriminatory intent against
a racial class. 6' The intent requirement was simply advanced as sufficient to trigger
strict scrutiny.62 However, if a statute or regulation employed either an explicit or im-
plicit racial classification,63 then strict scrutiny would be triggered because the use of
a classification could serve, on its own, as a sufficient indication of an Equal Protection
Clause violation to warrant strict scrutiny.64 As a result, post-Washington v. Davis,
there appear to be two mechanisms for triggering strict scrutiny: first, the use of an
explicit or implicit racial classification; and second, findings of discriminatory intent.65
Still, the question remains: why should discriminatory intent trigger strict scru-
tiny? Is crafting a statute that impacts a protected racial class, with invidious dis-
criminatory intent, not an Equal Protection Clause violation in and of itself? Indeed,
"[tihe central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race."66 And, as
already noted, "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant
use of a highly suspect tool. '67 With Washington v. Davis analysis, what remains to
be smoked out once a court already knows there has been invidious intent used in
drafting a particular statute?68
The answer appears in some of the Court's own formulation of a parallel purpose
of strict scrutiny. In Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, the Court restated one of
61 Id.
62 Cf. id. at 241.
63 See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (treating both "covert
and overt" classifications in the same manner); see also Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Co., 48
F.3d 810, 820 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Whether a statute or administrative action employs a classi-
fication explicitly or implicitly, the equal protection analysis of that state action consists of
the same two components.").
6 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[W]hen a
statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin[, t]hese factors are so seldom relevant
to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations
are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy .... For these reasons and because such
discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected
to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.").
65 See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
("[D]iscriminatory intent.., is required to show violation of the Equal Protection Clause.");
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ('There can be no doubt that restricting the free-
dom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
66 Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
67 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
68 This question has already been posed by Rubenfeld. See RubenfeldAffirmative Action,
supra note 26, at 436-37.
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the primary principles animating the application of the Equal Protection Clause:
"[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race,
that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."69 However, as the Court explained,
the mere fact that the government conduct in question runs afoul of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection does not end the inquiry: "It says nothing about the
ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court apply-
ing strict scrutiny.... The application of strict scrutiny... determines whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that injury. 70
As Jed Rubenfeld has noted,7' this characterization of strict scrutiny stands in
contrast to the "smoking-out" characterization articulated by the Court in Croson.72
In fact, alternative conceptualization of strict scrutiny gives rise to a second category
of equal protection cases. In this second category, once there has been a showing of
invidious discriminatory intent, there has indeed been aprimafacie Equal Protection
Clause violation.73 However, the Court then engages in strict scrutiny in order to
determine whether there is a legitimate enough government reason for the primafacie
violation.74 If there is such a legitimate enough reason, then that reason justifles the
prima facie violation.75 The Court has pointed to this alternative mechanism by
69 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995).
70 Id. at 230.
71 See Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, supra note 26, at 437-39.
72 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
73 Cf. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977) ("Proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." (emphasis added)).
7' A number of lower courts have applied this second characterization of strict scrutiny,
explaining that the compelling interest inquiry is still relevant even after a finding of discrimi-
natory intent. See, e.g., Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur. v. Tunica Co., 543 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir.
2008) (stating that in order to advance an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must allege both
the lack of compelling government interest and the existence of discriminatory intent); Valeria
v. Davis, 320 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[D]iscriminatory intent, by itself, triggers strict
scrutiny under a conventional equal protection analysis."); Houston Prof 1 Towing Ass'n v.
City of Houston, No. H-05-0323, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46598 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2005)
(citing Adarand for the proposition that "if a plaintiff demonstrates both discriminatory impact
and discriminatory intent, a court will use heightened scrutiny to determine whether the act
is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest"); Valdez v. Graham, 474 F.
Supp. 149, 156 (M.D. Fla. 1979) ("[I]f, indeed, a purpose or intent to discriminate is found, the
law or state action may still be valid if that purpose or intent passes muster under the 'rational
relation' or 'compelling state interests' tests."); Cicero v. Olgiati, 426 F. Supp. 1210, 1213
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[I]f racially discriminatory intent is established, however, the defendants
must show that the statute is justified by a 'compelling state interest."').
7' Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 260 (describing the lower court opinion as concluding
that "the denial of the... proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated
only if it served compelling interests").
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describing the purpose of strict scrutiny as a tool to determine whether "the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
76
It was also on this analysis that the Court upheld the internment camps in Korematsu:
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril,
is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when
under conditions of modem warfare our shores are threatened by
hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with
the threatened danger.77
Thus, not only are there two ways to trigger strict scrutiny, but the strict scrutiny
mechanism on each account is slightly different. 78 If a statute or regulation employs,
either implicitly or explicitly, a racial classification, then strict scrutiny is triggered
to see if there has actually been an Equal Protection Clause violation; in such circum-
stances, the racial classification indicates a high likelihood that there has been an
Equal Protection Clause violation.79 On the other hand, if a court can demonstrate
that invidious intent motivated a particular statute or regulation, then the Court uses
strict scrutiny to determine whether there is a good enough reason to justify the
primafacie Equal Protection Clause violation. The Court, having already found a
primafacie violation, now considers whether there is good enough reason to justify
that violation.8 °
To be sure, sometimes these two separate mechanisms converge in the same
case, making it difficult 8' to separate clearly the two strands of equal protection
76 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
17 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944). The Court has
subsequently implied that this was also the issue in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), because the circumstances surrounding the case made it clear that invidious
discriminatory intent had motivated the ordinances in question. Cf. Pers. Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979).
78 Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
'9 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
("[W]hen a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin[, t]hese factors are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that ... these laws are subjected
to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("[R]estricting the freedom to marry solely because
of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.").
80 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such racially-based restrictions.").
8" It is interesting to note that in Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye v. City ofHialeah, a post-
Employment Division free exercise case, the Court appears to have employed strict scrutiny
for two distinct purposes: first, to determine the existence of a prima facie violation, and
second, to justify the prima facie violation. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Thus, the Court first used
strict scrutiny to determine whether the city ordinances intentionally targeted the Church's
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analysis.8 2 A court may begin by examining a particular statute simply because it
employs a racial classification. 3 Although it may not be apparent on the face of the
statute, analysis of the surrounding facts may quickly make it obvious that invidious
discriminatory intent drove the drafting of the statute.' This appears to be a conse-
quence of the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, which emphasizes that "an
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts ... ."5 Having found invidious discriminatory intent, a court would then consider
whether there is a good enough reason to justify the prima facie Equal Protection
Clause violation."
Understanding the function of the intent requirement in Washington v. Davis
also helps us understand the content of the intent that can trigger strict scrutiny.
87
The intent cannot simply be the intent to use a racial classification; such intent
would not constitute a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause.88
Santerian practice of animal sacrifice. In doing so, the Court questioned whether the city
council's ordinances were narrowly tailored to achieve its stated purposes. Id. at 540 (citing
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Feeney, 422 U.S. 256).
After concluding that, based upon a wide range of evidence, the city council had indeed
intentionally targeted the religious practice of animal sacrifice, the Court then examined
whether "a law restrictive of religious practice must advance 'interests of the highest order'
and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." Id. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 518, 628 (1978)). In other words, after the Court had already scrutinized the
ordinances to determine that they were motivated by discriminatory intent, it then further
scrutinized the ordinances to see if there were interests in play that could justify the
discriminatory intent.
In this way, the Court recognized that strict scrutiny analysis comes in two stages: first,
the court considers whether a prima facie violation exists; and second, the court must
determine whether such aprimafacie violation can be justified. This is the implication of the
Court's decision in Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye as the Court drew on its own line of equal
protection cases in order to establish the appropriate methodology in the free exercise
context. Lukumi, albeit a free exercise case, serves as a useful blueprint of how strict scrutiny
serves a dual function.
82 Indeed, Professor Owen Fiss, in his description of, what he terms, the "anti-discrimination"
principle, notes that the "[anti-discrimination] account of the [equal protection] inquiry into
purpose suggests two steps: first, identifying the state purpose and second, determining whether
the purpose is legitimate." Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 107, 112 (1976). In the same way, our analysis envisions the possibility of a court
first determining whether there is an impermissible intent driving the relevant statute and upon
finding that there is, considering whether there is reason enough to justify such intent.
83 Id.
9 Id.
85 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
8 See id.; cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 260 (describing the lower court as holding that
"racially discriminatory effects.., could be tolerated only if it served compelling interests").
87 Davis, 426 U.S. 229.
88 Id.
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Instead, the intent must be "invidious." 9 The Court has used the term "invidious"
in the equal protection context since 1885, employing the term in a pair of cases:
Barbier v. Connolly9° and Soon Hing v. Crowley.9' In both cases, the Court dealt
with ordinances promulgated by the City and County of San Francisco prohibiting
washing and ironing in public laundries from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.9 And in both cases
the Court concluded that there was no equal protection violation because there was
no exercise of invidious discriminatory intent.93
But, in context, the definition of the term, as applied to intent, has been clarified
by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, most notably Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney.94 In Feeney, the Court considered Helen Feeney's claim that
the Massachusetts veteran's preference statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.9 5
Feeney argued that she had been unable to secure a civil service position, despite her
high scores on a number of competitive civil service examinations, because, pursu-
ant to the veterans' preference statute, lower-scoring veterans would be awarded the
desired civil service positions.' And, because veterans were typically male, the func-
tional impact of the veterans' preference statute was to preclude primarily women
from securing civil service positions, a violation, according to Feeney, of the Equal
Protection Clause. 97
The Supreme Court rejected Feeney's claim.98 According to the Court, "The dis-
positive question [was] whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based discrim-
inatory purpose ha[d], at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts veterans'
preference legislation." 99 In analyzing this issue, the Court focused on the ultimate
meaning of "invidious gender-based discrimination."'" In turn, the Court wondered
89 Cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 ("Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available."); Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 ("[A]n invidious discrimi-
natory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."). For a lengthy
attempt at a definition of invidious discrimination, see Marguerite A. Driessen, TowardA More
Realistic Standard For Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REv.
19, 22 (2002) ("[I]nvidious discrimination is an action that creates circumstances that would
tend to cause ill will or envy."). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose
and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111 (1983).
90 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
91 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
9 Barbier, 113 U.S. at 28; Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 705.
9' Barbier, 113 U.S. at 30; Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 708; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 367 (1886).
94 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 264.
97 Id. at 272.
98 Id. at 276.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 274-75.
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whether a party could demonstrate invidious discriminatory intent simply by showing
that the relevant governing body was aware of the consequences of their actions: "The
appellee's ultimate argument rests upon the presumption, common to the criminal
and civil law, that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
voluntary actions."'' In rejecting this argument, the Court explained what was nec-
essary to constitute invidious discriminatory intent:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or re-
affirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of,"
not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group. 102
Thus, it is not enough for a decision maker simply to be aware that particular legis-
lation will have disproportional impact on a particular group. That would fall within
the confines of disparate impact, which is insufficient to satisfy the intent inquiry.° 3
Instead, a decision maker is considered to have employed invidious discriminatory
intent where his purpose was to adversely affect a particular group and not where
he simply was aware of such a consequence. °4 Thus, "in Feeney, the Court asked
plaintiffs to prove that legislators adopting a policy that would foreseeably injure
women or minorities had acted with the express purpose of injuring women or
minorities ... ."'0' In this way, invidious intent is aimed at harming a particular
'o' Id. at 278.
102 Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1135 (1997) (describing this standard as a
"a legislative state of mind akin to malice"); see also Murad Hussain, Note, Defending the
Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counter-
terrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 944 (2007) ("Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
further defined 'discriminatory purpose' as the specific intent to adversely affect a particular
group.").
A similar line of analysis appears to have driven the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967). There, the Court began its analysis by emphasizing that "the Equal Protection
Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute consti-
tute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in
the States." Id. at 10. In turn, the Court found Virginia's anti-interracial marriage statute vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause because it found that such invidious discrimination moti-
vated the statute: "There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination which justifies this classification." Id. at 11. The Court then sought to
explain exactly how it determined the existence of invidious discrimination: 'There can be
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group."° And it is this type of intent that represents a prima facie violation of the
Equal Protection Clause: "[W]e have... held many times that 'invidious' distinctions
cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."' 7 Thus, an
individual is said to have acted with invidious discriminatory intent when he or she
advances a particular political agenda-for our purposes, captured in some sort of
political policy or statute--that seeks to visit harm or to restrict members of particular
racial classes because of their membership in that particular class. 108 This is because
decision makers might intend to enact legislation that will harm a particular group
without exercising invidious intent. ' 9 They may simply, to use the facts of Feeney,
intend for fewer women to secure civil service jobs; but their motivation was to
achieve some other sort of purpose, like providing more jobs to veterans. 110
There is another important conclusion that can be drawn from Feeney's analysis.
Invidious discriminatory intent is separate and apart from the purpose of the proposed
policy or legislation."' Thus, there may be many motivations for the exercise of in-
vidious discriminatory intent. A decision maker may in fact enact a particular policy
or piece of legislation because of its adverse impact on a particular group. However,
noting that a decision maker did employ invidious discriminatory intent does not ex-
plain what motivated him to do so. Indeed, the invidious intent inquiry is separate
from the examination of the motivation behind the exercise of that intent. Drawing
again on the facts of Feeney, a decision maker might have enacted the veterans' pref-
erence statute because it would prevent women from securing certain civil service
positions.!12 But, knowing that the decision maker employed invidious intent does
not explain what motivated him to do so.
Noting the difference between the intent behind a statute and the motivation be-
hind the exercise of the intent helps us understand how there could be reasons that
no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 12. In other words, the reason the
Court was so confident that there had been invidious discriminatory intent was because the
restriction on the freedom to marry was motivated by the race of the individuals. Put differently,
what made the intent invidious was that the restriction in question was enacted solely to impact
individual members of particular races because they were members of those particular races.
Thus, in Loving, invidious discriminatory intent was understood as intent that imposes some
sort of restriction or harm on a racial class for the purpose of visiting some form of restriction
or harm on the members of the racial class.
1o6 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
107 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
108 See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (analyzing whether an invidious
discriminatory intent had motivated racially based voting restrictions); Loving, 388 U.S. 1
(analyzing whether invidious intent had motivated racially based marriage restrictions).
'09 See Feeney, 442 U.S. 256.
110 Id.
.. Id. at 279.
112 See Feeney, 442 U.S. 256.
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justify aprimafacie violation of the Equal Protection Clause stemming from invidious
discriminatory intent. Indeed, Korematsu, although not explicitly, appears to be such
a case."' The Court began its inquiry in Korematsu by stating:
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can." 4
The military order before the Court in Korematsu forced individuals of Japanese
descent into internment camps."' Thus, it was a restriction on the civil rights of a
racial group in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 116 Although not explicit in
Korematsu, the military order was promulgated with invidious discriminatory intent
as Congress sought to impose a restriction on a racial group intended to harm or re-
strict that particular racial group."' 7 However, while there may have been a prima
facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause, that does not mean, by necessity, that
such a violation cannot be justified. In fact, the Court found that the interests of
national security, the motivation behind the exercise of the invidious intent, did jus-
tify the prima facie violation and therefore the military order passed constitutional
muster."8 Such a conclusion amounted to finding a good enough reason to justify the
invidious discriminatory intent behind the order. "9 However, had "racial antagonism"
been the motivation behind the exercise of invidious discriminatory intent-the other
option considered by the opening paragraph of the Court's discussion-then the in-
vidious discriminatory intent would not have been justified and the military order
would have been struck down.' 20
In sum, we might reformulate the two categories of equal protection analysis as
follows. The primary holding, and intuition, of Washington v. Davis is that to trigger
strict scrutiny, you need to present more than mere disparate impact.' 21 Instead, you
"3 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
114 Id.
" Id. at 215.
116 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
117 Id.
"' Id. at 215, 223, 225.
"9 Id. at 223-25.
120 Another way of describing this same reasoning is that initially we may find the existence
of invidious discriminatory intent. However, once the government produces a sufficient reason
for the discrimination in question, the intent is no longer considered invidious. I choose not
to phrase the analysis in this way simply for the sake of simplicity. This alternative, however,
would also fit with the overall equal protection scheme presented in this Article.
12 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O1ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
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must either (1) point to an implicit or explicit racial classification that indicates-based
on a history of discrimination-a strong likelihood that the statute in question violates
the Equal Protection Clause as it is motivated by invidious discriminatory intent; or
(2) demonstrate that invidious discriminatory intent served as the motivation for the
statute in question, which proves aprimafacie Equal Protection Clause violation. 22
V. STIGMATIC HARM AND BENIGN CLASSIFICATIONS
Our foregoing analysis brings us to the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
affirmative action programs as potential Equal Protection Clause violations. In City
of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., the Court addressed the City of Richmond's plan,
which required prime contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar
amount of contracts to Minority Business Enterprises. 123 One such contractor brought
suit, claiming that the plan violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 14
Ruling in favor of the respondent, 25 the Court found that the plan did trigger strict
scrutiny 126 and, in turn, violated the Equal Protection Clause,' 27 even though the racial
classification appeared to benefit a protected racial group. 128
In justifying the application of strict scrutiny to the Richmond plan, the Supreme
Court explained:
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility. We thus reaffirm the view expressed by the
plurality in Wygant that the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefitted by a particular classification. 129
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
122 See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("Certain classi-
fications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm.
A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can
be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification. This rule applies as well to a classification
that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination." (internal citations
omitted)).
123 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 511.
126 Id. at 495.
127 Id. at 511.
128 See id. at 498.
129 Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted).
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The existence of stigmatic harm serves to explain, in part, why the racial classification
in the Richmond plan triggered strict scrutiny. 3' The text of the plan, on its face, used
a racial classification.11 This racial classification harms a protected racial class, even
if those who drafted it did not intend the harm.132 As a result, because courts are faced
with a racial classification that harms the relevant protected class, they must use strict
scrutiny to see if there is indeed an Equal Protection Clause violation.
133
This argument fits City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. into the first category of
strict scrutiny applications. Courts use strict scrutiny because they have an indica-
tion, the racial classification, that there may be an Equal Protection Clause violation:
"Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice
than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category."' 34
As a result, because the Court was working within the indication category of strict
scrutiny and not the violation category of strict scrutiny, the Court did not need to
examine whether the potential discriminatory effects of the racial classification were
intentional; the Court already had the necessary indicator that the Richmond plan
might violate the Equal Protection Clause. 35 This is why the Richmond plan, accord-
ing to the Court, triggered strict scrutiny. 136
Differentiating between strict scrutiny as triggered by an indication of an Equal
Protection Clause violation (racial classification employed by a statute) and strict
scrutiny as triggered by a prima facie Equal Protection Clause violation (the use of
intentional invidious discrimination to motivate a statute) has led to undue criticism
of current Equal Protection Clause doctrine. For example, Jed Rubenfeld has attacked
recent Equal Protection Clause decisions, writing:
The five Justices who decided Adarand have no intention of over-
turning Washington v. Davis, which holds that inadvertent racial
harms are not enough to trigger strict scrutiny. I think Davis is
correct, so I am not arguing that the Court should overrule that
case. But so long as the five Justices remain committed to it, we
cannot take seriously their repeated proclamations that strict
scrutiny for affirmative action is necessary and proper because
affirmative action inadvertently harms minorities.'37
130 Id. at 493.
"I Id. at 477-78.
132 Id. at 493.
133 id.
"3 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
131 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
136 Id. at 493.
13' Rubenfeld, Anti Anti-Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1174; see also Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, supra note 26.
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But this critique misses the different ways to trigger strict scrutiny and the unifying
rationale behind the alternative triggers.'3 8 The Supreme Court has ruled that disparate
impact is not enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 3 9 Instead, in order to trigger strict scru-
tiny you need to show the Court something more.' 4 The alternatives for something
more are either some racial classification employed by the statute or regulation, or
actual invidious discriminatory intent in the creation of the statute or regulation.' 4'
A racial classification is enough of an indication that there may have been an Equal
138 To be sure, Rubenfeld explicitly considers the possibility that the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to determine whether the costs of the racial classification are outweighed by the
benefits of the racial classification. In this way, the core distinction between indicator and
violation cases is already made by Rubenfeld. However, Rubenfeld dismisses the possibility
of violation cases for the following reason:
Offsetting state benefits cannot "justify" a law violating an individual's
equal protection rights. That is what it means to have an equal protection
right; the right is not subject to any ordinary cost-benefit calculus. Treat-
ing an ethnic group as a menial class may serve any number of compel-
ling state interests. Most peoples since the dawn of time have thought
as much. Racial subjugation might even, conceivably, produce the great-
est happiness for the greatest number. But the Fourteenth Amendment
blocks every state action directed to this end, whatever interests it might
serve.
Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, supra note 26, at 441. This argument appears grounded in a
particular conception of rights as trumps, see Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES
OF RIGHTS 153-67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984), or rights as side constraints, see ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 30-33 (1974), where built into the very concept of
rights is, by definition, their inability to be trumped by social concerns. On such an account,
equal protection rights could not be justified by reference to compelling government interests;
if they were, then we could no longer call equal protection rights, rights.
However, there is another well-established view on the nature of rights-what is some-
times termed the interest-based theory of rights. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
166 (1986). As Jeremy Waldron has noted, the interest-based account of rights leaves open
the strong possibility that rights can be trumped under particular circumstances. See Jeremy
Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 518-19 (1989). It is therefore possible, and I
would argue correct, to conclude that current equal protection doctrine has adopted the interest-
based account of rights. In turn, it is possible--contrary to Rubenfeld's conclusions-that
some equal protection cases correctly employ strict scrutiny to determine whether primafacie
equal protection violations can bejustified based upon compelling government interests. Of
course, this is not to say that such rights can be trumped easily. The whole point of strict
scrutiny, on such an account, is to prevent justifying such violations based upon insufficient
government interests. In sum, while Rubenfeld's approach clearly has paved the way for im-
pressive analysis of the divergent purposes of strict scrutiny, his dismissal of the violation
category seems premature. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, 138 (discussing the con-
cerns created by racial classifications and the functions of strict scrutiny).
' See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
'40 Id. at 242.
141 Id. at 244-45.
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Protection Clause violation that the Court does not require demonstration of invidious
discriminatory intent.142 The rationale for not requiring intent when there is a racial
classification is that in U.S. history, the existence of such racial classifications usually
meant that African-Americans were not receiving equal protection of the laws.
Rubenfeld conflates the two categories by arguing from one to the other. 143 He
believes that the intent requirement in Washington v. Davis means that there can be
no trigger of strict scrutiny without invidious discriminatory intent.'4 But that is not
the case. You can trigger strict scrutiny simply by employing a racial classification,
which is why the Court has struck down statutes that use such classifications in order
to promote affirmative action projects.1 45
VI. WHY NARROW TAILORING?
To be sure, Rubenfeld, in conflating the two triggers for strict scrutiny, is in
good company. 146 Indeed, in the ever-evolving Equal Protection Clause doctrine,
the Supreme Court seems to have missed this same point, a problem that becomes
clear upon examining the Court's conclusion that "[t]o withstand our strict scrutiny
analysis, [a party] must demonstrate that [its] use of race in its... program employs
'narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.' '1 47
The Court has always remained somewhat vague on the purpose of narrow tai-
loring. Narrow tailoring was first applied in the equal protection context in Fullilove
v. Klutznick. 4 There, in his dissent, Justice Stevens outlined the reason for employing
the narrow tailoring mechanism, a reason adopted by the Supreme Court in subsequent
majority decisions: "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any
but the most exact connection between justification and classification."149 The Court's
majority subsequently incorporated Justice Stevens' explanation of strict scrutiny,
further explaining that "[u]nder strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the
State's asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that
purpose." 5' In further adopting and explaining Justice Stevens' analysis, the Supreme
Court wrote, in a footnote, that
142 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
143 See Rubenfeld, Anti Anti-Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1174-76.
'4 See id. at 1174.
145 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (holding that Richmond's plan to distribute a certain set
percentage of construction work to minority owned businesses violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
146 See Rubenfeld, Anti Anti-Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1174.
147 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
148 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980).
149 Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15' Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280 (1986) (citing Fullilove, 488 U.S.
at 480).
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[t]he term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases,
has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as com-
mentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consid-
eration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means
could have been used. Or, as Professor Ely has noted, the classi-
fication at issue must "fit" with greater precision than any alter-
native means.15'
The initial intuition behind "narrowly tailoring" was to examine whether the state
had to use the racial classification in order to accomplish its goal. 52 But what would
it mean if there were alternative means, which avoided the racial classification, to
accomplish the same goal?
In answering this question, we must first note that, by itself, the fact that a state
used a racial classification to pursue a particular goal when it could have used another
means of achieving the same goal does not amount to a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause: "Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' ' 153 Thus, failing narrow tailoring does
not demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, it appears that,
like racial classifications, failing narrow tailoring indicates that there has been an
Equal Protection Clause violation; the lack of "fit" makes us think the alleged goal
of the racial classification is pretextual." When a court finds a racial classification,
applies strict scrutiny, and finds that the racial classification was not necessary for
the alleged governmental purpose, the court has two indicators that there has been an
Equal Protection Clause violation: the racial classification and the lack of narrow
tailoring. Together, the two indicators present enough evidence for the court to con-
clude that there has been an Equal Protection Clause violation.
This analysis, however, changes under the second category of strict scrutiny out-
lined above where we already know there has been a primafacie Equal Protection
Clause violation. Again, such is the case when a party demonstrates, in accordance
with Washington v. Davis, that a state has used invidious discriminatory intent in
crafting a particular statute or regulation.'55 Once there is evidence of a prima facie
violation, narrow tailoring cannot serve as an indicator; we do not need an indication
... Id. at 280 n.6 (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimi-
nation, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974)).
152 See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480.
153 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
"5 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 36, at 146 ("[Flunctionally, special scrutiny, in par-
ticular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of 'flushing out' uncon-
stitutional motivation ..." (footnote omitted)); Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, supra note
26, at 436-37.
"' See 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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of a prima facie violation when we know there has been a prima facie violation.
Instead, once there is evidence of invidious discriminatory intent, we use strict scrutiny
to see if there is an important enough reason to justify the primafacie violation. 1 6 If
there does exist a goal that is sufficiently important to justify the violation, then we use
narrow tailoring to see if we truly needed the primafacie violation to achieve this suf-
ficiently important goal: "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.' '15 7 Were the statute to fail narrow tailoring,
it would mean that the goal cannot justify the violation because we could achieve the
goal through other means.'58 In such circumstances, failing narrow tailoring serves
to demonstrate the existence of an Equal Protection Clause violation and that such a
violation does not have a justification.5 9 Therefore, in order to overcome the prima
facie violation, the state must demonstrate that invidious discrimination both "serve[s]
a compelling governmental interest, and [is] narrowly tailored to further that interest.' 'lW
Presumably, this is what the Court thought was accomplished in Korematsu; the in-
vidious discrimination achieved national security and there was no way to achieve
national security other than through invidious discrimination. 161 In this way, the two
uses of narrow tailoring naturally follow from the two roles of strict scrutiny.
There is at least one important consequence of our analysis. When dealing with
equal protection cases where a statute or regulation employs a classification either
implicitly or explicitly, we use narrow tailoring as an indication that there has been an
Equal Protection Clause violation.'62 The actual goal itself, however, appears to be
irrelevant. Thus, it would seem that we do not care if the goal is "important enough"
because we are not trying to justify aprimafacie Equal Protection Clause violation.
We are simply trying to see if we have enough indicators of invidious discriminatory
intent. If the racial classification is not necessary for the goal, then we have an indi-
cation that the goal may be pretextual, giving more credence to concluding that the
true purpose of the racial classification is intentional racial discrimination. But, again,
the quality or importance of the alleged goal for using the racial classification should
not matter; it only appears to matter whether the racial classification was necessary
for achieving the goal.'63
156 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
7 Id. (emphasis added).
158 See id. at 507.
159 See id. at 493.
0 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,235 (1995); see also Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986) ("There are two prongs to this examination. First, any
racial classification 'must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.' Second, the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achieve-
ment of that goal."' (citations omitted)).
161 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
162 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
163 See id. at 508-10 (finding that the Richmond plan was not narrowly tailored to rectify
discrimination because of other race-neutral alternatives at the City's disposal).
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And yet, the Court has stated that "any racial classification 'must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest.""' This remains true in our indicator category
where we ostensibly should be looking only to see if the reasons for the classification
fit with the interest at stake. It seems most reasonable, then, to conclude that when the
Court applies the "compelling government interest" requirement to indicator cases,
it should do so in a way that fits with the overall structure of such cases. Thus, if there
is no compelling government interest justifying the racial classification, it indicates
a higher likelihood that there has been an equal protection violation. Indeed, because
there are very few circumstances under which it makes legitimate sense to employ a
racial classification, the lack of a compelling reason could be viewed, when within the
indicator category, as an indication of a likely equal protection violation.'65
In contrast, the "compelling government interest" requirement applied to violation
cases-where we have already found aprimafacie Equal Protection Clause violation-
functions more conventionally.' 66 As already explained, the rationale justifying the
primafacie equal protection violation must be compelling-or important enough-if
it is indeed going to justify the primafacie violation.' 67 It is, therefore, in these cases
where the "compelling government interest" truly serves as a justification, explaining
that we should tolerate the primafacie equal protection violation because a compelling
government interest is at stake.
VII. A RECAPITULATION
To recapitulate, this Article claims that there are two types of potential Equal
Protection Clause cases.
The first category-what this Article has termed indicator cases--encompasses
cases where a court encounters a racial classification employed by either a statute or
regulation. The court takes this racial classification as an indication that there is likely
to have been some sort of Equal Protection Clause violation. In order to examine this
hypothesis, the court asks the individual or entity why they have used the racial classi-
fication. The court then considers whether the alleged permissible use of the racial
classification fits with the actual use of the classification, examining whether the racial
classification was necessary for achieving the stated goal. In addition, the court exam-
ines the alleged goal to see how important the goal is. If the goal is not particularly
important, the court is skeptical of the use of a racial classification. Together, the
"6 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429,432 (1984)); see also Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 235 (1995) (same).
165 See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.
166 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (finding that the government's interest in protecting
national security was compelling enough to justify racially-based legal restrictions).
167 See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
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use of a racial classification that is not both narrowly tailored and in service of a
compelling government interest gives the court good reason to believe the relevant
text violates the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, they do not know with certainty
that there has been a violation; a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires
invidious intent, and no evidence has necessarily been presented regarding the intent
in drafting the text. But with these indicators in hand, the Court believes it has good
enough reason to strike down the legislation or regulation as a likely violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
The second category, which follows the Adarand paradigm, encompasses cases
where a court knows that there has been aprimafacie violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. This is the case when the court encounters evidence that individuals or entities
have exercised invidious discriminatory intent in the crafting of the relevant legislation
or regulation. Under such circumstances, the court then uses strict scrutiny to see if
there is a good enough reason for the prima facie Equal Protection Clause violation.
Thus, if the violation is narrowly tailored to accomplish a sufficiently important goal,
like national security in Korematsu, then we tolerate the use of invidious discrimina-
tory intent. In this category, the violation category, we use the compelling government
interest requirement to justify the primafacie violation. Then, we use the narrow tai-
loring requirement to see if we truly needed invidious discriminatory intent to achieve
the compelling government interest. Thus, strict scrutiny is a mechanism to justify a
potential violation, not to check to see if there are indications of a violation. Put dif-
ferently, in the violation category, the court already knows the facts that it is looking
for in an indication category case.
VIII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES: WHERE ARE THE INDICATORS?
This brings us to the purpose of our analysis: an examination of the Court's
rulings in affirmative action cases. But before looking at the actual cases, it is im-
portant to note the following. Affirmative action cases, by their nature, fit into the
indicator category; affirmative action programs single out a minority group or groups
for benefit.' 68 Thus, either implicitly or explicitly, they use racial classifications."6
And, as already explained, in dealing with cases of racial classifications, the Court's
task is to find indicators of an Equal Protection Clause violation. 7°
"~ See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). Kim Forde-Mazrui notes that although some affinative action efforts seem race-
neutral, they are nonetheless race-conscious. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, 138, at 2333.
"6 See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274 (addressing a university's admissions policy that ex-
plicitly considered race).
170 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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A. Racial Classifications in Affirmative Action Cases
Of course, the first indicator is the racial classification itself.'7 ' Thus, the pro-
grams in Bakke, 172 Grutter, 173 Gratz, 174 Croson,75 and Adarand,176 all used some sort
of racial classification. The implicit argument made by the Court is that these racial
classifications give us an indication that there may be an Equal Protection Clause
violation.177 Indeed, the indication is so strong that it triggers strict scrutiny.
But have courts applied the rationale behind indicator cases in applying strict scru-
tiny to affirmative action cases? This Article argues that they have not. As explained
above, racial classifications are treated differently than other classifications because
of both the history and relative power of racial classes.77 Because of these factors,
when we typically see a racial classification, we believe it to be very likely that there
has been an underlying Equal Protection Clause violation. 179 However, this does not
appear to be the case for racial classifications used to benefit a racial class.180 Indeed,
the historical use of such classifications would appear to undermine any claim that
such classifications employed in affirmative action cases indicate that there may be
an underlying Equal Protection Clause violation.' 8'
For all intents and purposes, the Supreme Court dealt with this argument in
Bakke.182 Allan Bakke had brought suit against University of California, Davis, (U.C.
Davis) Medical School for employing an admissions process that held spots for minor-
ity applicants.8 3 Bakke claimed that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause
as he incurred loss as a result of his race." The California Supreme Court found in
favor of Bakke and U.C. Davis Medical School appealed to the Supreme Court.' 5
Among the Supreme Court's many holdings was that simply because the harm
was incurred by somebody white did not mean that the Court should not use the strict
scrutiny standard when evaluating a racial classification. 186 The Court emphasized
... See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,273-74 (1986) (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)); see also supra text accompanying note 31.
172 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-73 n.1.
173 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
174 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003).
171 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,477-78 (1989).
176 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 207 (1995).
177 See Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488
U.S. 469; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
178 See discussion supra Part III.
179 See discussion supra Part Il.
180 See Rubenfeld, Anti Anti-Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1171.
'~l Id. at 1167.
182 438 U.S. 265.
183 Id. at 276-78.
184 Id. at 277-78.
185 Id. at 279-81.
186 Id. at 290.
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its dedication to equality: "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."' 87
The Court further attacked the notion that they should apply a different standard of
review because the classification's purpose was benign:
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive
view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination
against members of the white "majority" cannot be suspect if its
purpose can be characterized as "benign." The clock of our liber-
ties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868. It is far too late to
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits
the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection
greater than that accorded others. "The Fourteenth Amendment
is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class
theory'-that is, based upon differences between 'white' and
Negro." 188
But none of this is truly accurate. We do treat different claims differently; equal pro-
tection does mean one thing when applied to an African-American, and another when
applied to somebody old, and maybe even another thing when applied to a woman. 89
We treat different claims from individuals from different classes differently. This
was the choice the Court made when it decided that the best way to operationalize
the Equal Protection Clause was to use protected racial classifications as an indicator
that there may be an Equal Protection Clause violation.' 9 The Court's rhetoric in
Bakke simply overlooks these facts and accuses the petitioner of trying to impose
a two-tiered ward system.' 91
To be sure, the Court has not ignored this counter-argument. In addressing this
problem head on, the Court argued as follows:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
187 Id. at 289-90.
188 Id. at 294-95 (citations omitted).
189 Rubenfeld, Anti Anti-Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1172-73 ("Surprising as it may
be, the present majority of the Supreme Court essentially uses the Constitution's phrase 'the
equal protection of the laws' to force states to deny blacks (and other racial minorities) a legal
right enjoyed by many other minority groups.").
"9o See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
the Equal Protection Clause applies with particular veracity when "discrete and insular
minorities" are concerned).
19 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 n.26 (noting that white students were prohibited from
competing for admission places reserved for minorities).
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classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
"smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legisla-
tive body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen
"fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possi-
bility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.'9
Unfortunately, the Court's argument moves a bit too quickly. The Court's concern is
that there is no way to determine whether a classification is benign or remedial. 93 As
a result, it simply takes the existence of a racial classification as an automatic trigger
of strict scrutiny and then assumes that the narrow tailoring and compelling govern-
ment interest criteria will help differentiate between likely and unlikely violations of
the Equal Protection Clause. 194
But is it true that there is no way to determine whether a particular racial classi-
fication is benign or remedial? The answer would appear to be no. As the Court
explained in Washington v. Davis, investigating the intent behind a particular racial
classification can tell us quite a lot about the potential for an Equal Protection Clause
violation. '95 In fact, as intent is a necessary criterion for an Equal Protection Clause
violation, it is curious that the Court does not look to intent as part of its indicator
analysis.' 96 Moreover, Washington v. Davis and its line of cases have gone far in
explaining how we might go about determining the intent behind a particular racial
classification; 197 thus, claims that the task is too complicated are misplaced.
Singling out racial classifications for strict scrutiny only makes sense because the
history of such classifications makes it likely that some invidious discriminatory intent
was at work. Consequently, we allow racial classifications to trigger strict scrutiny
because the use of a racial classification serves as a strong indicator about intent.
However, it does not make sense to construe the use of a racial classification as indi-
cating a high probability of an Equal Protection Clause violation when there are even
more indications that no invidious discriminatory intent was at work in the crafting
of the legislation or regulation. Thus, in the affirmative action context, the rationale
behind using racial classification as an indicator of invidious discriminatory intent
stands at loggerheads with stronger and more direct indicators that there was no
exercise of invidious discriminatory intent.
192 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
193 id.
194 id.
195 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976).
196 For a discussion of the significance of a "racially discriminatory purpose," see id. at 240.
197 See id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Frequently the most probative evidence of
intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened .... ").
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B. Stigmatic Harm in Affirmative Action Cases
Some readers may not like the argument presented above. In response, they may
note that the existence of stigmatic harm is what is motivating the Court's triggering
of strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases. To consider this response, we must re-
examine the text of the Court's presentation of the stigmatic harm argument:
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility. We thus reaffirm the view expressed by the
plurality in Wygant that the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefitted by a particular classification.1
98
On this argument, stigmatic harm explains why the racial classifications should trigger
strict scrutiny.'99 Because there is a racial classification, and a racial classification by
its nature imposes harm on a protected racial class, we must trigger strict scrutiny to
ensure that there is a remedial purpose for using the racial classification. 200
But this argument misses the mark. When dealing with a case of a racial classifi-
cation, we trigger strict scrutiny because of the indicators we have of a possible Equal
Protection Clause violation °" However, as previously argued, the racial classification
in affirmative action cases does not provide sufficient indication of such a violation
in light of the obvious-and legally deducible-intent employed in the crafting of
the statute. 2 The fact that the racial classification, by its nature, imposes harm on a
protected racial class does not indicate much.20 3 Indeed, the fact that a statute simply
imposes harm on a protected racial class never triggers strict scrutiny; that is why dis-
parate impact does not trigger strict scrutiny as we have no indication that there is a
connection between the harm experienced by the protected racial class and the moti-
vation behind the crafting of the statute.' Again, this is why Washington v. Davis
required intent in cases of disparate impact.205 Thus, the only way for harm, on its
own, to trigger strict scrutiny is when there is also evidence of intent. But, as already
noted, there is often no evidence of invidious discriminatory intent in affirmative
198 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (citations omitted).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 493-95.
2o See discussion supra Part III.
2 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
13 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
2 See id.
205 Id.
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action cases; to the contrary, there is evidence that there was no invidious discrimi-
natory intent in the crafting of the statute or policy.
2°6
There is one last argument for using the racial classification in affirmative action
cases as an indicator of invidious discriminatory intent. For the purposes of Equal
Protection Clause analysis, the Court has simply created a knee-jerk response to any
racial classification, whether explicit or implicit. 7 Indeed, it does so even when there
appears to be good reasons not to. On such an account, the use of racial classifications
in U.S. history is so abominable that we simply must investigate under the most rigid
scrutiny any use of such classifications. 2 8 As argued below, not even this argument
can get the Court off the hook.
C. Compelling Government Interest in Affirmative Action Cases
Let us assume for now that we have rejected the argument above and triggered
strict scrutiny because of a racial classification even if the classification was used in
an affirmative action program. Let us also assume that we are dealing with a case
where the racial classification was necessary to achieve the alleged goal of the classifi-
cation; in other words, let us assume that the narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied.2'9
The Court then moves on to examine whether there is a compelling government in-
terest in using the racial classification.21°
Let us again take the Supreme Court's analysis of the rationale advanced by U.C.
Davis Medical School for holding spots for racial minorities in Bakke.2" The first two
reasons for granting preference to applicants from racial minorities were "(I) 'reducing
the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession' [and] (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination. '21 2 The
Court took its task to be deciding "if any []of these purposes is substantial enough
to support the use of a suspect classification. 213
In dispensing with the first two rationales presented by U.C. Davis Medical
School, Justice Powell noted, "We have never approved a classification that aids per-
sons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other
206 See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (noting that the purpose for crafting
these admission policies was to increase diversity of students).
207 See discussion supra Part VLI.B (discussing the Court's reaction to stigmatic harm in
affirmative action cases).
208 See discussion supra Part I.
209 To be sure, many of the affirmative action cases fail because the Court finds that the
racial classification is not narrowly tailored to achieve the alleged goal. See, e.g., Gratz, 539
U.S. 244 (holding that the university's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the school's diversity interest).
20 See id.; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-33.
211 438 U.S. 265, 307-15 (1978).
212 Id. at 305-06 (citation omitted).
213 Id. at 306.
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innocent individuals in the absence ofjudicial, legislative, or administrative findings
of constitutional or statutory violations."2 '4 Moreover, even if such findings had been
made, U.C. Davis would still have to demonstrate that "the governmental interest in
preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is substantial, since
the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated." '215 Doing so would typically be
done with reference to the necessary "extent of the injury" which would "have been
judicially, legislatively, or administratively defined."2 '6 In sum, "[w]ithout such find-
ings of constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government has
any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from harming another.
Thus, the government has no compelling justification for inflicting such harm." '217
Furthermore, seeking to ameliorate societal discrimination could not serve as a
basis for the medical school's policy because it "imposes disadvantages upon persons
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of
the special admissions program are thought to have suffered." '218 Indeed, "[t]o hold
otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal
rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their
pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. 219
According to Justice Powell, "That is a step we have never approved. 22°
Justice Powell's analysis, however, ignores the purpose of the compelling govern-
ment interest criterion. Powell argues that the interests advanced by U.C. Davis harm
applicants who were not members of a racial minority, like Allan Bakke.22' But such
an argument is irrelevant once we realize that we are only looking for a compelling
government interest in order to bolster our concern that the racial classification indi-
cates the use of invidious discriminatory intent. Indeed, the reason we triggered strict
scrutiny was because, historically, the use of racial classifications typically were in
the service of racial discrimination. Thus, strict scrutiny is a mechanism to find more
indications of discrimination against the protected racial class. Findings like those
of Justice Powell, which highlight the harm to other individuals, may be problematic
and pose independent policy and legal arguments.222 They do not, however, serve as
indicators of invidious discrimination and are therefore irrelevant to Equal Protection
Clause analysis. When U.C. Davis Medical School uses a racial classification to fur-
ther the remedying of societal discrimination, at best, the racial classification only
further demonstrates the lack of invidious discrimination.223 The Court completely
214 Id. at 307.
215 id.
216 Id. at 308.
217 Id. at 308-09.
218 Id. at 310.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 319-20.
222 See id. at 310.
223 See id.
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missed the purpose of its examination of the rationales for the racial classification,
simply looking to see if any of the purposes advanced by U.C. Davis Medical School
were "substantial enough," instead of recognizing that the substantial enough criterion
is meant to serve as an indicator.224 Consequently, the Bakke Court took the purpose
of the "substantial enough" criteria from violation cases, construing the various ratio-
nales advanced by U.C. Davis Medical School to be justifying the use of the racial
classification. 225 But, as we have explained, Bakke is an indicator case as the racial
classification indicated the possibility of an equal protection violation; in Bakke, there
was absolutely no demonstration of a primafacie violation based upon invidious dis-
criminatory intent.226 Thus, there was no reason to consider whether the various ratio-
nales behind the medical school's admission policy were substantial enough to justify
the policy, because there was no prima facie violation to justify. By mixing the task
of the "substantial enough" criterion in violation cases with the task of the "substantial
enough" criterion in indicator cases, the Court wrongly struck down societal discrim-
ination as a legitimate purpose for the racial classification.227
IX. DIVERSITY AS THE NEW DISCRIMINATION: A FORTIORI ARGUMENTS
The Bakke Court did find one purpose advanced by the U.C. Davis Medical
School that was "substantial enough" to potentially allow the racial classification to
survive strict scrutiny: diversity.22 In contrast to its treatment of the other rationales
for the racial classification, a plurality of the Court was persuaded by the goal of diver-
sity advanced by the medical school justifying its use of a suspect racial classification,
deeming it constitutional.229
The Supreme Court grounded the goal of diversity in the First Amendment, noting
the importance for a university to promote a "robust exchange of ideas" through its
selection process.23 ° In detailing its conclusion that diversity did indeed lead to an
improved exchange of ideas, the Court explained that
[a]n otherwise qualified medical student with a particular back-
ground-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged
or disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of medicine
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its
student body and better equip its graduates to render with under-
standing their vital service to humanity. 3
224 Id. at 306.
225 id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 307-10.
228 Id. at 311-12.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
231 Id. at 314.
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More specifically, "a black student can usually bring something that a white person
cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all ... students...
depends in part on these differences in the background and outlook that students
bring with them.,
232
The analysis in Bakke has served as the starting point for subsequent Supreme
Court decisions regarding affirmative action in higher education.233 While the out-
comes have differed, the kernel remains unchanged; thus in Grutter, the Court began
by noting that "Justice Powell approved the university's use of race to further only
one interest: 'the attainment of a diverse student body.' 234
At first glance, this appears to be a development that benefits the African-American
community. Although the Court may be applying the "substantial enough" or "com-
pelling government interest" standard from violation cases instead of from indicator
cases, the fact that diversity survives is a recognition of African-American culture and
its value to American society. Such a result, we might think, bodes well for programs,
whether public or private, that seek to use racial classifications to advance the cause
of the African-American community.
Nothing could be further from the truth. And the reason stems directly from our
analysis thus far. First, by mixing up the indication and violation categories, 235 the
Court has used diversity to justify a racial classification. However, the plausibility of
diversity justifying a racial classification stems from the particulars of the circum-
stances of the cases; it just makes sense to allow diversity to justify an admissions
policy that helps African-Americans. Put another way, the Court can adopt diversity
as justifying a racial classification because it really only needs to function as an indica-
tion. Thus, the bar for a reason that justifies is lowered. Let's consider another case.
Imagine if in Korematsu the government had somehow advanced diversity as the
rationale behind internment camps; the details of the connection are not important
now, but assume that narrow tailoring had been satisfied. The Court, presumably,
would not have found diversity "substantial enough" to justify internment camps. For
internment camps, you need a reason like national security,236 and even national secu-
rity strikes many of us as dubious. In Bakke, the Court, in looking for important pur-
poses of the racial classification, took-and erroneously so on our account-its task
to be the same as the task in Korematsu: to justify a prima facie Equal Protection
Clause violation.237 But because we were not talking about a classification that
232 Id. at 323.
233 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
234 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311); see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at
270-71.
235 For a discussion of the distinctions that should be drawn between indication and violation
cases, see supra Part IV.
236 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
237 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
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harmed a racial minority in Bakke, the Court was willing to use diversity to justify
the classification.238
And here is the problem. Once we are willing to use diversity as ajustification,
then the bar for what suffices as a justification has been lowered. We now may very
well be willing--even in cases when we truly need a justification of a prima facie
Equal Protection Clause violation-to employ purposes that should not be sufficient.
Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested as much already, making one of the
paradigmatic "a fortiori arguments" that we already cited above:
Similarly, racial profiling policies and guidelines that permit law
enforcement officers to consider race, among other factors, when
they possess "trustworthy information, relevant to the locality
or time frame, that links persons of a particular race or ethnicity
to an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization" also
pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause. If student body
diversity in university law schools is a compelling governmental
interest, then surely crime control also qualifies as such."'
The argument here, simply put, is if diversity works, then of course crime control
works. But this is a dubious argument. Diversity works because it did not have to
do too much; it simply had to serve as an indicator that no invidious discriminatory
intent was at work. Crime control actually has to justify what is a full-blown prima
facie Equal Protection Clause violation;24 racial profiling employs a racial classifi-
cation and is motivated by invidious discriminatory intent. While this may on some
account be justified, an argument regarding its justification must be made under strict
scrutiny analysis."
The fear is that in cases where racial profiling passes Fourth Amendment require-
ments, diversity may give it the leverage necessary to pass Equal Protection require-
ments. While we may think that crime control should be able to justify aprimafacie
Equal Protection Clause violation, we should not think so because diversity worked.
And using diversity as leverage in racial profiling is only step one. There may be
other marginally beneficial reasons-reasons only slightly more convincing than
238 Id. at 311-13.
239 Smith, supra note 21 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
240 Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L.
REv. 1413, 1416 (2002) ("Racial profiling may also be challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking
Racial Profiling: A Critique ofthe Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature,
and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHi. L. REv. 1275, 1279 (2004).
241 See Harcourt, supra note 240, at 1279-80 (discussing how racial profiling may pass
strict scrutiny).
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diversity-that will now satisfy the "substantial enough" criterion because diversity
already blazed the constitutional path.242
X. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PARENTS INVOLVED
Given our foregoing analysis, what indications do we have about the Court's equal
protection's jurisprudence going forward? How might the Court address potential
future afortiori arguments? The Court's recent decision in Parents Involved gives
some important indications, some of which have been missed by many of the initial
evaluations of the decision. Indeed, a careful analysis of Parents Involved uncovers
the potential for a new majority on the Court, one that might break with the Grutter,
Gratz, and Bakke line of cases and move the Court sharply not as widely thought to
the right, but to the left of center.
A. The Two Dominant Views
The Court's companion decisions from 2003-Gratz and Grutter-serve as the
key guideposts to understanding the new trajectory of the Court's equal protection
analysis.243 As already intimated, the Court's majority in both Gratz and Grutter
applied strict scrutiny to the relevant admissions plans in order to determine whether
or not the admissions plans violated the Equal Protection Clause. 24' Therefore, the
Court examined the plans to see if they were narrowly tailored to further compelling
government interests. 245
In both cases, the Court followed the plurality in Bakke, affirming diversity as a
compelling government interest.246 What differentiated Gratz from Grutter was the
majority's application of narrow tailoring to each case.247 According to the Court,
"To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota
242 For a discussion of some of these potential "marginally beneficial" reasons, including
safety and crime prevention, see id. at 1280-81; Smith, supra note 21, at 234.
243 For a critical analysis of the Gratz-Grutter strict scrutiny paradigm, see Ian Ayres &
Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 517 (2007) (arguing that the Court's deference to vague affirmative actions plans on
one hand and intense scrutiny of detailed plans on the other is misplaced).
244 See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 260 (2003) (holding that admissions policy based on admitted quotas of minorities
violated the Equal Protection Clause), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)
(holding that admissions policy using race merely as one "plus" factor did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
245 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326, 339.
246 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
247 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 243, at 542-43 (stating that Gratz's narrow tailoring was
based on "individualized consideration" alone whereas Grutter established a four-part test
for narrow tailoring, of which individualized consideration was one part).
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system-it cannot 'insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifi-
cations from competition with all other applicants.'"2 In Gratz, the Court concluded,
"We find that the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or one-
fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single 'underrepresented
minority' applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the
interest in educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program."24 9
In contrast, the Court concluded in Grutter that the admissions plan was narrowly
tailored, arguing
[t]hat a race-conscious admissions program does not operate as a
quota does not, by itself, satisfy the requirement of individualized
consideration. When using race as a "plus" factor in university
admissions, a university's admissions program must remain flex-
ible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an indi-
vidual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity
the defining feature of his or her application. The importance of
this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious
admissions program is paramount. 250
In turn, the admissions plan in Grutter was narrowly tailored "[b]ecause the...
[s]chool consider[ed] 'all pertinent elements of diversity... .,,25 In other words, an
admissions plan that engaged in individualized consideration of each applicant, includ-
ing the race of each applicant, was narrowly tailored to achieve diversity because it
ensured that applicants were, in fact, diverse; however, admissions plans that simply
tacked on points for being part of a particular minority were not narrowly tailored be-
cause they did not, in fact, embody a system designed to produce truly diverse student
bodies.252 Or at least, so the argument goes.
The majority opinion in Parents Involved, for the most part, followed the Gratz-
Grutter analysis.25 3 The majority subjected the school assignment plans in question
to strict scrutiny and then examined whether the plans were narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.2s In turn, the Court took its first shot at
248 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (alteration in original) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978)).
249 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
250 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37.
251 Id. at 341.
252 For a more in depth discussion of this distinction between the admissions policies in
Gratz and Grutter, see Aaron Baker, Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a U.S.
"Suspect Classifications" Model Under Article 14 ECHR in the U.K., 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
847, 871 (2008).
253 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751-52
(2007).
254 Id. at 2751-61.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the assignment plan by noting that they were not covered by Grutter because Grutter
only articulated a compelling interest of diversity for higher education, a holding that
did not apply to the elementary school assignment plans before the Court.255 More-
over, the Court held that the assignment plans in question were not narrowly tailored
because school assignments were not individualized in a manner consistent with
Grutter, Gratz, and Bakke.256 These reasons, among others, led the Court to con-
clude that the assignment plans could not survive strict scrutiny as they were neither
narrowly tailored nor did they achieve a compelling interest."
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, at-
tacked the majority opinion, using arguments similar to those advanced by the dissent
in Grat. 258 At its core, the dissenting view advanced the principle "that the govern-
ment may voluntarily adopt race-conscious measures to improve conditions of race
even when it is not under a constitutional obligation to do so. '259 Indeed, the dissent
argued that in cases where school assignment plans are used to remedy both dejure
and defacto discrimination, a "contextual approach to scrutiny is altogether fitting."'26
Justice Breyer, in explaining the reasons behind and limited use of a less than strict
scrutiny standard, argued for applying such a standard to the school assignments be-
fore the Court:
This context is not a context that involves the use of race to decide
who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed
on the basis of merit and which are in short supply. It is not one
in which race-conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits
at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise signifi-
cantly exacerbate racial tensions. They do not impose burdens un-
fairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek benefits
for members of all races alike. The context here is one of racial
limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to bring them
together.26'
This is an all too brief recapitulation of the two dominant views in the Court's
recent decision in Parents Involved.262 This Article does not focus on either of
25 Id. at 2753-54.
256 Id. at 2755-61.
257 Id. at 2760.
258 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 291-98 (2003) (Souter J., dissenting).
" Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2814 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 2819.
261 Id. at 2818.
262 For a more thorough discussion of Parents Involved, see Elizabeth Dale, Death or
Transformation? Educational Autonomy in the Roberts Court, 43 TULSA L. REv. 725,
730-32 (2008).
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these views; it is Justice Kennedy's view that holds out the potential to radically
alter our current equal protection scheme and defang the lurking a fortiori argu-
ments outlined thus far.263
B. Kennedy's Concurrence: Who Needs the Diversity Rationale Anyway?
Justice Kennedy's concurrence has received important attention, especially because
of his insistence that the majority opinion "impl[ies] an all-too-unyielding insistence
that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into ac-
count. ' 2 4 Initially, it seems as if Kennedy is simply headed towards re-articulating
the position of the Court in both Gratz and Grutter, but hoping to emphasize some
of Grutter's willingness to allow certain types of plans to pass strict scrutiny.26 In
keeping with such an approach, Kennedy emphasized that the central problem of the
school assignment plans before the Court was the lack of narrow tailoring, accusing
the school assignment plans of simply "employ[ing] the crude racial categories of
'white' and 'non-white' as the basis for its assignment decisions." 266 Indeed, in keep-
ing with his dissent in Grutter,267 Kennedy argues that strict scrutiny was the right
standard for the instant case and that the assignment plans did not satisfy it.268
But Kennedy goes on to make an incredible argument-an argument not lost upon
the dissent269-- cited in full below:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students
of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, per-
formance, and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are
race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny
to be found permissible. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958
(1996)... (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply
merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of
263 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing the harm caused by a
fortiori arguments regarding the diversity rationale).
264 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
265 Id. at 2792-93.
266 Id. at 2790-91.
267 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388-89 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
269 See id. at 2819-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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race.... Electoral district lines are 'facially race neutral' so a
more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be
found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of 'classifi-
cations based explicitly on race"' (quoting Adarand, 5 15 U.S. at
213 .. .)). Executive and legislative branches, which for genera-
tions now have considered these types of policies and procedures,
should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confi-
dence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a
decision maker considers the impact a given approach might have
on students of different races. Assigning to each student a per-
sonal designation according to a crude system of individual racial
classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis
changes accordingly.270
Here, Kennedy seeks to differentiate between school policies that are "race-conscious"
and policies that employ "crude systems of individual racial classifications., 271' This
distinction comes close to mirroring the distinction that differentiated Gratz from
Grutter; the admissions policy in Gratz was struck down because it also gave a
"crude" plus of twenty points for applicants from racial minorities.272 Grutter, on the
other hand, involved a more individualized "race-conscious" scheme which allowed
it to pass strict scrutiny.273
But, upon careful analysis, it is clear that this is not the distinction Kennedy is
presenting. According to Kennedy, race-conscious policies that do not go so far as to
employ crude racial classifications should not be subjected to strict scrutiny at all: "[It
is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible .... ,,274
This stands in stark contrast to, for example, Grutter where the Court concluded that
the fact that Michigan's admissions policy was not "crude" enabled the plan to survive
strict scrutiny. Here, Kennedy suggests that the fact that certain race-conscious policies
were not "crude" would enable them to avoid strict scrutiny. Thus, Kennedy advances
a distinction not embraced by either the majority or the minority. On the one hand,
the majority would require any race-conscious policy to survive strict scrutiny in order
to be held constitutional.275 On the other hand, the minority would allow remedial
270 Id. at 2792 (Kennedy J., concurring) (first emphasis added).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 2790-91 (describing "white" and "non-white" classifications as "crude"); Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003).
273 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
274 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
275 Id. at 2751-52 ("It is well established that when the government distributes burdens
or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, the action is reviewed under strict
scrutiny .... [R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact
connection between justification and classification." (citations omitted)).
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race-conscious policies to avoid strict scrutiny in keeping with their construction of
Brown's legacy.276 Kennedy has chosen to import the distinction of Gratz and Grutter,
but instead of using the distinction to determine which policies are narrowly tailored,
he uses a similar distinction to determine which policies require strict scrutiny.277
Thus, a race-conscious policy, regardless of whether it is remedial or not, may not re-
quire strict scrutiny, pushing Kennedy's position even beyond the position advanced
by the dissent.
2 78
In order to advance this proposition, Kennedy cites to a single case, Bush v.
Vera, 2 7 a case that addresses not school assignment policies, but rather racial redis-
tricting. Indeed, as Pamela Karlan has demonstrated, the Court's racial redistricting
jurisprudence represents an exception to the standard Equal Protection analysis em-
ployed by the Court in other cases.28 ° The exceptional nature of the Court's racial re-
districting jurisprudence lies primarily in the intent necessary to trigger strict scrutiny.
In contrast to the general rule, strict scrutiny is triggered in the racial redistricting con-
text only when "race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. ' '2 ' In
turn, "[t]o make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compact-
ness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual
shared interests, to racial considerations., 28 2 In Bush v. Vera-again, the case cited
276 Id. at 2817-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
277 Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
278 Some of the initial reviews of Parents Involved have simply glossed over this point. See,
e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Equal Protection: The Non-Preferment Principle and the "Racial
Tiebreaker" Cases, 2006-07 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 239; Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy
and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARv. L. REv. 104 (2007); Michael J. Kaufman,
PICS in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 (2007); James E. Ryan,
The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARv. L. REv. 131 (2007); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There is No Other Way, 121 HARv.
L. REv. 158 (2007).
279 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
280 See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and AffirmativeAction
After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1569 (2002).
211 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,916 (1995) (emphasis added). This carve out for racial
redistricting began with the Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,646,648 (1993)
(noting that "race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination"
and concluding that redistricting will trigger strict scrutiny "[w]hen a district obviously is
created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group.. ."(emphasis
added)). See Karlan, supra note 280, at 1576 ("[I]n Shaw v. Reno, there were hints that the
Court was tweaking conventional equal protection doctrine. It modified both what triggers
strict scrutiny and what counts as a compelling state interest in important and potentially far-
ranging ways. Those modifications have been amplified in its later decisions.").
282 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (emphases added).
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by Kennedy in his concurrence-the Court distilled this standard by focusing the race-
conscious inquiry in racial redistricting cases on whether, in the deliberations over a
particular redistricting measure, "race predominated." '283 Thus, put into our own termi-
nology, demonstrating that race motivated a particular redistricting does not, on its
own, trigger strict scrutiny because it is not a sufficient indicator of a potential equal
protection violation.28 4 The reason is because redistricting invariably-at least accord-
ing to the Court-entails considering race. Redistricting cases, according to the Court's
current thinking, are indicator cases; we are looking for indications of aprimafacie
equal protection violation-but we do not have sufficient indicators to trigger strict
scrutiny when legislators simply consider race as one factor among others.285 Indeed,
the reason underlying the Court's refusal to allow mere race-consciousness to trigger
strict scrutiny in the racial redistricting context is because, in such a context, being
race-conscious indicates very little: "The redistricting decisions recognize that aware-
ness of race cannot be removed entirely from the [redistricting] process; as long as
race does not subordinate other considerations, taking it into account does not trigger
strict scrutiny.,
286
Again, this standard has been explicitly rejected by the Court outside of the racial
redistricting context. In standard equal protection cases, the Court has concluded
that once race becomes a "a motivating factor in the [legislative or administrative]
decision, judicial deference is no longer justified., 287
In other words, the Court refuses to grant deference to a legislative or adminis-
trative decision once it has been determined that race was a factor in the final determi-
nation. This, of course, makes sense.288 In standard equal protection cases, the mere
consideration of race--even if race does not predominate-makes us deeply suspi-
cious that there has been an equal protection violation.289 In most circumstances, when
race serves as a motivation, we have a sufficient trigger for strict scrutiny given the
past history of discrimination against the minority group in question.
213 Vera, 517 U.S. at 963.
284 See Karlan, supra note 280, at 1598 ("The redistricting decisions recognize that aware-
ness of race cannot be removed entirely from the process; as long as race does not subordinate
other considerations, taking it into account does not trigger strict scrutiny.").
285 Id.; Vera, 517 U.S. at 959 (sustaining the district court's finding that the redistricting plan
at issue was not subject to strict scrutiny because there were "mixed motive[s]," such as
"incumbency protection," and evidence did not show that race was the "predominant factor").
286 Karlan, supra note 280, at 1598.
287 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 525,565-66 (1977) (emphasis
added). See generally Karlan, supra note 280.
288 See Karlan, supra note 280, at 1583.
289 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,291 (1978) ("Racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944) ("[All legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
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In contrast, when considering racial redistricting cases, the Court grants the
drawing of a new district deference until it has been determined that race was the pre-
dominant factor motivating the decision, and not just one such factor because race-
consciousness is understood to be an inextricable consideration in the redistricting
decision-making process.290 In sum, both redistricting and standard parallel equal
protection cases are indicator cases; the only difference between the two is that the
Court has taken a contextualized approach to understanding the use of race as a moti-
vation; accordingly, the Court does not consider the mere use of race as a motivation
to indicate a prima facie equal protection violation in redistricting cases because it
perceives race as inextricably linked to the process of redistricting.
Kennedy's concurrence appears to take this contextual approach to equal pro-
tection cases one step further. By citing Bush v. Vera for the proposition that "race
conscious" mechanisms are "unlikely [to] demand strict scrutiny to be found permis-
sible,"' 29' he appears to be extending the racial redistricting logic to school assign-
ment cases. Again, the reason a different standard is applied in racial redistricting
cases is because the Court has argued race inevitably becomes a part of every
redistricting decision.292 Consequently, the Court will not invalidate redistricting
simply because race played a role in the decision-making process.293 This rationale
applies regardless as to whether race is employed in the redistricting process as a
remedial measure or otherwise. 294 The point in the redistricting cases is that race is
an inevitable part of the process.295
Along similar lines, Kennedy apparently understands race to be bound up so
tightly with education decisions that we must come to expect race to be a consider-
ation in the administration of the educational system in the same way that the Court
290 See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
29 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
292 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) ("Redistricting legislatures will, for
example, always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates
in the redistricting process.").
293 Id.
294 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,657 (1993) ("Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from
the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters .... It is for these reasons that
race-based districting... demands close judicial scrutiny.").
295 Focusing on the application of the predominant motivation standard falls in line with
the view already advanced by Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Use Proxiesfor Race After
the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 277, 290 (2007). On Fitzpatrick's
account, Kennedy may have intended to have courts apply the predominant motivation standard
in all "racial gerrymandering" cases. Id. In contrast, in the account advanced in this Article,
Kennedy sought to import the standard applied in racial redistricting cases to school assignment
and potentially affirmative action cases. And, as already noted, this link stems from the internal
logic of each context.
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appears to assume that race is an inextricable part of the redistricting process.296 This
means that the mere fact that school decision makers are "race conscious" during the
decision-making process should not trigger, on its own, strict scrutiny, even in cases
where the use of race is not remedial in nature. This would appear to be because in
the school assignment context, the mere use of race as a single motivating factor is not
a very good indicator of a potential equal protection violation. Thus, strict scrutiny
applies in the school assignment context in the same way it applies in the redistricting
context: its mere use as a single motivation among many is not a very good indicator
of a prima facie equal protection violation.297
Using our own terminology, Kennedy analyzes "race conscious" educational
policies as indicator cases. This makes sense given our own taxonomy: the question
in such cases is whether the consideration of race, in the absence of evidence of in-
vidious discriminatory intent, is a sufficient indicator to give rise to a prima facie
equal protection violation. And, following the Court's analysis in redistricting cases,
Kennedy has given his own contextual spin to "race conscious" educational policies.29
Because educational decisions invariably demand the consideration of race, proof that
the relevant decision makers simply used race as one consideration among others in
formulating their policy is not a sufficient indicator of an underlying primafacie equal
protection violation.
This link between school administrative decisions and racial redistricting cases en-
ables Kennedy to redefine the role of diversity for the purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. As already explained, pursuing diversity requires individualized analysis of
each potential student in order to determine whether or not to accept the student and
where to assign the student.299 But with the link to redistricting in hand, individ-
ualized analysis, which also employs considerations of diversity, simply amounts
to race conscious school administrative decisions; schools consider diversity along-
side "myriad" other considerations. 300 In other words, reference to permissible diver-
sity considerations amounts to using racial concerns as a consideration, but not the
predominant consideration. In this way, individualized decision-making procedures
never, by definition, run afoul of the redistricting requirement that race never become
the predominant consideration.01 Put differently, employing a permissible diversity
scheme, according to Kennedy, does not trigger strict scrutiny because, like permissible
296 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[P]arts of the opinion
by the Chief Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in in-
stances when, in my view, it may be taken into account.").
297 Id. at 2792 (arguing that certain "race conscious" mechanisms for achieving diversity
would not require strict scrutiny (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996))).
298 Id.
299 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
'00 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
301 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 243, at 543 ("[A]I1 that remains of narrow tailoring
analysis is the individualized consideration requirement.").
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redistricting cases, race is not the predominant consideration, and under such circum-
stances, there simply are not enough indicators to trigger strict scrutiny.
The diversity rationale, according to Kennedy, becomes not a compelling inter-
est justifying the use of an impermissible racial classification, but an explanation for
why we should not trigger strict scrutiny. °" Indeed, that diversity is no longer a justi-
fication for a primafacie equal protection violation makes perfect sense given that
Kennedy has recast such cases as indicator cases through his linkage to the racial
redistricting cases. °3 In other words, the diversity rationale, according to Kennedy,
serves as a contextual argument, orienting the application of equal protection doctrine
from the indicator category of the case law. In cases where schools are able to use
diversity as one of many considerations-what amounts to an individualized admin-
istrative scheme-then we do not have sufficient indicators of a prima facie equal
protection violation. 4 On the other hand, when schools define students by race for
the purposes of an administrative decision, then race has served as the predominant
motivation and such a use of race, even given the educational context, is a sufficient
indicator pointing to a potential primafacie equal protection violation. In these latter
cases-as was the case, according to Kennedy, in Parents Involved-the indications
are sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. 5
This inversion of the standard equal protection scheme-recasting the diversity
rationale not as a compelling interest, but as an indication that we need not trigger
strict scrutiny-also holds out a potential answer to advocates of afortiori arguments.
Recall that a fortiori arguments claim that if diversity is a compelling government
interest, then so are other interests typically thought to be insufficiently important for
the purposes of strict scrutiny analysis. For example, if diversity is compelling then
so is effective policing, a conclusion that arms advocates of racial profiling schemes.
But Kennedy has recast the effect of the diversity rationale. While in Gratz and
Grutter the diversity rationale served as a compelling government interest under strict
scrutiny, the diversity rationale serves a very different purpose in Kennedy's new
scheme. Race-conscious diversity policies do not need to satisfy strict scrutiny. In-
stead, when a school policy is a race-conscious attempt to encourage diversity, then
Kennedy's reformulation of the diversity rationale counsels us to avoid strict scrutiny
all together. In this way, the diversity rationale no longer is held to be a compelling
government interest for passing strict scrutiny, but is an exception-much like in the
racial redistricting cases--to the strict scrutiny mechanism. Indeed, in Kennedy's
account, because diversity need not aid in satisfying strict scrutiny, it no longer must
be held to be compelling. If we can shed diversity of its compelling label, then the
launching ground for afortiori arguments has been eliminated.
302 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
303 id.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 2797.
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To be sure, it is hard to decipher exactly where even Kennedy himself envisions
his own concurrence taking the law. But Kennedy has presented a radically new vision
of the diversity rationale as part of the overall Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
And this new vision presents at least one way to combat afortiori arguments.
CONCLUSION
It is important to conclude by noting that our discussion is not meant as an
endorsement of the Court's analysis of the Equal Protection Clause-far from it. This
Article has attempted to reconstruct the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions
in an attempt to understand the Court's vision of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court appears to have centered equal protection analysis on invidious discriminatory
intent. However, such focus has given rise to somewhat problematic reasoning, con-
flating various brands of equal protection analysis under the single rubric of invidious
discriminatory intent. In retrospect, this endeavor has proven too burdensome, giving
birth to a set of doctrines that contradict their own foundations. Thus, the Court now
uses racial classifications aiming to benefit racial minorities as indicators of intent to
harm minorities. And, it now threatens-through the use of afortiori arguments-to
justify statutory provisions that harm racial minorities by noting the constitutionality
of statutory provisions that benefit racial minorities.
This Article has also outlined the way in which the Court's most recent decision-
Parents Involved-might foreshadow where equal protection jurisprudence is headed.
While this recent decision does, in many ways, follow from its predecessors, this
Article has also examined the way in which Justice Kennedy's concurrence presents
a response to future afortiori arguments. Implicit in Kennedy's analysis is the potential
to shift certain types of equal protection cases that arise in the education context-
"race conscious" cases-from the violation category to the indicator category.
While not logically necessary, it is not surprising that, in using intent as its foun-
dation stone, the Court has crafted internally inconsistent doctrine. 3 7 Creating proce-
dures to deduce and justify what is in the hearts of men is a tall order. To require such
an inquiry as a prerequisite for the finding of an Equal Protection Clause violation
leaves the constitutional safety of racial minorities on precarious ground. Indeed,
because the Court focuses on intent in determining whether particular racial harms are
unconstitutional, it leaves racial minorities without direct protection from such racial
harm. 30 8 And, as we have seen, focusing on intent often leaves us blind to the global
picture, enabling beneficial racial classifications to be deemed indications of invidious
discriminatory intent.
" Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, supra note 26, at 432 ("The framework [of
equal protection review] itself, in current form, is unsound. And it is precisely the Court's
treatment of affirmative action that has made it so.").
3os See id. at 449.
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One answer to this problem may be to conclude that the entire intent enterprise
is misguided. Maybe instead the legal doctrine should be focusing on racial harm
as the gravamen of Equal Protection analysis. In fact, a wide range of scholars have
advocated such an approach.3" However, this Article leaves such arguments for
another day. Suffice it to say, something seems to have gone wrong with the current
intent paradigm that may require a significant reconstruction of the doctrine.
Thus, to summarize, this Article presents two categories of Equal Protection
Clause cases. In one category, the Court scrutinizes racial classifications because it
is all too aware of how such classifications have been used in the past. However, be-
cause it does not know if there has actually been an Equal Protection Clause violation,
it uses indicators to determine whether it is sufficiently likely that invidious discrim-
inatory intent is at work. The second category of cases requires the Court not to inves-
tigate to see if there has been an Equal Protection Clause violation, but to consider
whether there are good enough reasons for a prima facie violation.
The problems we have described occur when the Court mixes and matches the
purposes and criteria of these two categories. Indeed, the result has been to pick out
the remedying of societal discrimination as an indicator of racial discrimination
while contemplating crime control as potentially validating an already existent
prima facie Equal Protection Clause violation. These ironies are a direct result of
confusing the indication and violation categories. Whether the Court can resolve
them under the current intent paradigm remains to be seen; indeed, it does not
appear that the Court even thinks that there is a problem. But something must
change if the Equal Protection Clause is to make good on its promise to remedy the
ills of America's discriminatory past.
" See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Suzzana Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT.
257 (1996); Fiss, supra note 82; Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv.
2410 (1994).
